State v. Wade: The Court of Appeals Tackles “Other Suspect” Evidence
In State v. Wade, Division One of the Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed the second-degree murder conviction of Gary Wade for the December 2010 strangulation death of Michelle Thornton, finding that it was not error for the trial court to exclude proffered evidence that Ms. Thornton’s ex-boyfriend, not Mr. Wade, was a possible suspect in her death.
Ms. Thornton was strangled in her Belltown apartment during the early morning hours of December 30, 2010. Forensic evidence was consistent with death by strangulation and Mr. Wade’s DNA was found on Ms. Thornton’s body and under her fingernails. Fingerprints matching Wade were found on beer cans inside the apartment, surveillance footage showed he and Ms. Thornton entering and exiting the apartment building at times consistent with the State’s theory that Mr. Wade was the last person to visit Ms. Thornton while she was still alive, and Mr. Wade eventually admitted to being at her apartment at the time of her death, claiming she had a heart attack.
Ms. Thornton also had an ex-boyfriend who had been convicted of assaulting her and had left threatening voicemails on her answering machine. However, his most recent voicemails discovered on her machine were from October and November and were nonthreatening in nature. There was also nothing to establish, from surveillance footage or otherwise, that he was at Ms. Thornton’s apartment in the days leading up to her body’s discovery.
The trial court excluded the defense’s proffered evidence of the ex-boyfriend’s prior conviction and threatening voicemails, reasoning that although the defense has the right to present a defense, that right does not extend to presenting speculative or irrelevant evidence.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, citing to the 2014 Washington Supreme Court decision State v. Franklin, in which the Supreme Court held that the test for relevance was whether there was evidence “tending to connect” someone other than the defendant to the crime. In Franklin, the trial court erred by first considering the strength of the evidence in support of the State’s case in deciding whether to admit “other suspect” evidence, and the conviction was reversed. Here, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly narrowed its focus on the evidence in support of the other suspect claim, and reasoned that because there was no evidence placing the ex-boyfriend at the scene around the time of the crime, the proffered evidence was too speculative to be admissible.
