State of Washington v. Rodriguez: Examining the Strangulation Prong of the Assault 2 Statute
In 2007 the Washington Legislature added another prong to the Assault Second Degree statute, defining “assault by strangulation or suffocation” as its own means of committing Assault 2, a “strike” offense under Washington law. Previously, an incident of strangulation would have to produce “substantial bodily harm” in order to meet the definition of Assault 2, but that is no longer the case. Instead, the defendant must only “compress a person’s neck, thereby obstructing the person’s blood flow or ability to breathe, or doing so with the intent to obstruct the person’s blood flow or ability to breathe.” Naturally, this has opened the door to questions about exactly what this means. The Court of Appeals, Division I, recently handed down an opinion in State v Rodriguez, defining the meaning of “obstruct” as it pertains to the strangulation statute.
The defendant, Rodriguez, arrived at his girlfriend’s house early in the morning (around 4 A.M.) and heavily intoxicated after an evening that included watching a boxing match, patronizing an after-hours club, and confronting a male friend of his girlfriend. Rodriguez was met at the door by his girlfriend, Hendon, and was offered some food. Rodriguez responded to this offer by cursing about not wanting food and attacking Hendon, grasping her throat with his hands two or three times. When police arrived, Hendon was found outside of her home with her teenage daughter, visibly shaken and displaying signs of having been assaulted. Her injuries were photographed and a statement was taken from her where she described being jumped on by Rodriguez and choked to the point of having difficulty breathing multiple times. Rodriguez stood trial for assault in the second degree – domestic violence and was found guilty. He appealed the ruling asserting that the State had not established that he “obstructed” her breathing or blood flow as the statute requires it so do.
Being tasked with deciding whether the State met its evidentiary burden, the Court of Appeals began by looking at the statute for assault in the second degree. The statute states that “a person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she…assaults another by strangulation or suffocation.” The Court then looked at the statutory definition of “strangulation” (listed at 026), to see if it applied in Rodriguez’s case. The definition of “strangulation” has two parts, 1) that a persons neck is compressed and 2) thereby their breathing or blood flow is obstructed. The parties disputed the meaning of “obstruct” which is not defined by statute.
Rodriguez originally contended that “‘obstruct’ necessarily means to completely obstruct.” The Supreme Court countered that this definition flies in the face of the ordinary meaning of the word, as evidenced by its common usage as well as the dictionary definition. Commonly, when referring to things such as traffic, “obstruct” is modified by another word like “partially” or “completely”. Without one of those modifiers, like it appears in the statute, obstruction can be either partial or complete, not necessarily one or the other. Webster’s Dictionary provides a two-part definition of “obstruct”: 1) to block up 2) to be or come in the way of. Rodriguez argued for the first definition since it would seem more favorable but the Court found differently. The Court decided that, in the strangulation context, a person’s breathing or blood flow is obstructed in degrees, not discrete intervals. So instead of determining whether strangulation occurred by counting the number of obstructions to a victim’s breathing or blood flow, the Court should look at the force of compression applied. In conclusion, the Court decided that the definition of “obstruct” to slow down or make difficult the flow of air or blood in the body to some degree, not to cut off completely. For that reason, the Court found that the State met its burden and thus the judgment against Rodriguez was affirmed.
